Senator Charles Schumer's office issued the following yesterday:
08.06.15
My Position on the Iran Deal
Every several years or so a legislator is called upon to cast a
momentous vote in which the stakes are high and both sides of the issue
are vociferous in their views.
Over the years, I have learned that the best way to treat such
decisions is to study the issue carefully, hear the full, unfiltered
explanation of those for and against, and then, without regard to
pressure, politics or party, make a decision solely based on the merits.
I have spent the last three weeks doing just that: carefully studying
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, reading and re-reading the
agreement and its annexes, questioning dozens of proponents and
opponents, and seeking answers to questions that go beyond the text of
the agreement but will have real consequences that must be considered.
Advocates on both sides have strong cases for their point of view
that cannot simply be dismissed. This has made evaluating the agreement a
difficult and deliberate endeavor, and after deep study, careful
thought and considerable soul-searching, I have decided I must oppose
the agreement and will vote yes on a motion of disapproval.
While we have come to different conclusions, I give tremendous credit
to President Obama for his work on this issue. The President, Secretary
Kerry and their team have spent painstaking months and years pushing
Iran to come to an agreement. Iran would not have come to the table
without the President’s persistent efforts to convince the Europeans,
the Russians, and the Chinese to join in the sanctions. In addition, it
was the President’s far-sighted focus that led our nation to accelerate
development of the Massive Ordinance Penetrator (MOP), the best military
deterrent and antidote to a nuclear Iran. So whichever side one comes
down on in this agreement, all fair-minded Americans should acknowledge
the President’s strong achievements in combatting and containing Iran.
In making my decision, I examined this deal in three parts: nuclear
restrictions on Iran in the first ten years, nuclear restrictions on
Iran after ten years, and non-nuclear components and consequences of a
deal. In each case I have asked: are we better off with the agreement or
without it?
In the first ten years of the deal, there are serious weaknesses in
the agreement. First, inspections are not “anywhere, anytime”; the
24-day delay before we can inspect is troubling. While inspectors would
likely be able to detect radioactive isotopes at a site after 24 days,
that delay would enable Iran to escape detection of any illicit building
and improving of possible military dimensions (PMD) – the tools that go
into building a bomb but don’t emit radioactivity.
Furthermore, even when we detect radioactivity at a site where Iran
is illicitly advancing its bomb-making capability, the 24-day delay
would hinder our ability to determine precisely what was being done at
that site.
Even more troubling is the fact that the U.S. cannot demand
inspections unilaterally. By requiring the majority of the 8-member
Joint Commission, and assuming that China, Russia, and Iran will not
cooperate, inspections would require the votes of all three European
members of the P5+1 as well as the EU representative. It is reasonable
to fear that, once the Europeans become entangled in lucrative economic
relations with Iran, they may well be inclined not to rock the boat by
voting to allow inspections.
Additionally, the “snapback” provisions in the agreement seem
cumbersome and difficult to use. While the U.S. could unilaterally cause
snapback of all sanctions, there will be instances where it would be
more appropriate to snapback some but not all of the sanctions, because
the violation is significant but not severe. A partial snapback of
multilateral sanctions could be difficult to obtain, because the U.S.
would require the cooperation of other nations. If the U.S. insists on
snapback of all the provisions, which it can do unilaterally, and the
Europeans, Russians, or Chinese feel that is too severe a punishment,
they may not comply.
Those who argue for the agreement say it is better to have an
imperfect deal than to have nothing; that without the agreement, there
would be no inspections, no snapback. When you consider only this
portion of the deal – nuclear restrictions for the first ten years –
that line of thinking is plausible, but even for this part of the
agreement, the weaknesses mentioned above make this argument less
compelling.
Second, we must evaluate how this deal would restrict Iran’s nuclear development after ten years.
Supporters argue that after ten years, a future President would be in
no weaker a position than we are today to prevent Iran from racing to
the bomb. That argument discounts the current sanctions regime. After
fifteen years of relief from sanctions, Iran would be stronger
financially and better able to advance a robust nuclear program. Even
more importantly, the agreement would allow Iran, after ten to fifteen
years, to be a nuclear threshold state with the blessing of the world
community. Iran would have a green light to be as close, if not closer
to possessing a nuclear weapon than it is today. And the ability to
thwart Iran if it is intent on becoming a nuclear power would have less
moral and economic force.
If Iran’s true intent is to get a nuclear weapon, under this
agreement, it must simply exercise patience. After ten years, it can be
very close to achieving that goal, and, unlike its current unsanctioned
pursuit of a nuclear weapon, Iran’s nuclear program will be codified in
an agreement signed by the United States and other nations. To me, after
ten years, if Iran is the same nation as it is today, we will be worse
off with this agreement than without it.
In addition, we must consider the non-nuclear elements of the
agreement. This aspect of the deal gives me the most pause. For years,
Iran has used military force and terrorism to expand its influence in
the Middle East, actively supporting military or terrorist actions in
Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Gaza. That is why the U.S. has
labeled Iran as one of only three nations in the world who are “state
sponsors of terrorism.” Under this agreement, Iran would receive at
least $50 billion dollars in the near future and would undoubtedly use
some of that money to redouble its efforts to create even more trouble
in the Middle East, and, perhaps, beyond.
To reduce the pain of sanctions, the Supreme Leader had to lean left
and bend to the moderates in his country. It seems logical that to
counterbalance, he will lean right and give the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard (IRGC) and the hardliners resources so that they can pursue their
number one goal: strengthening Iran’s armed forces and pursuing even
more harmful military and terrorist actions.
Finally, the hardliners can use the freed-up funds to build an ICBM
on their own as soon as sanctions are lifted (and then augment their
ICBM capabilities in 8 years after the ban on importing ballistic
weaponry is lifted), threatening the United States. Restrictions should
have been put in place limiting how Iran could use its new resources.
When it comes to the non-nuclear aspects of the deal, I think there
is a strong case that we are better off without an agreement than with
one.
Using the proponents’ overall standard – which is not whether the
agreement is ideal, but whether we are better with or without it – it
seems to me, when it comes to the nuclear aspects of the agreement
within ten years, we might be slightly better off with it. However, when
it comes to the nuclear aspects after ten years and the non-nuclear
aspects, we would be better off without it.
Ultimately, in my view, whether one supports or opposes the
resolution of disapproval depends on how one thinks Iran will behave
under this agreement.
If one thinks Iran will moderate, that contact with the West and a
decrease in economic and political isolation will soften Iran’s hardline
positions, one should approve the agreement. After all, a moderate
Iran is less likely to exploit holes in the inspection and sanctions
regime, is less likely to seek to become a threshold nuclear power after
ten years, and is more likely to use its newfound resources for
domestic growth, not international adventurism.
But if one feels that Iranian leaders will not moderate and their
unstated but very real goal is to get relief from the onerous sanctions,
while still retaining their nuclear ambitions and their ability to
increase belligerent activities in the Middle East and elsewhere, then
one should conclude that it would be better not to approve this
agreement.
Admittedly, no one can tell with certainty which way Iran will go. It
is true that Iran has a large number of people who want their
government to decrease its isolation from the world and focus on
economic advancement at home. But it is also true that this desire has
been evident in Iran for thirty-five years, yet the Iranian leaders have
held a tight and undiminished grip on Iran, successfully maintaining
their brutal, theocratic dictatorship with little threat. Who’s to say
this dictatorship will not prevail for another ten, twenty, or thirty
years?
To me, the very real risk that Iran will not moderate and will,
instead, use the agreement to pursue its nefarious goals is too great.
Therefore, I will vote to disapprove the agreement, not because I
believe war is a viable or desirable option, nor to challenge the path
of diplomacy. It is because I believe Iran will not change, and under
this agreement it will be able to achieve its dual goals of eliminating
sanctions while ultimately retaining its nuclear and non-nuclear power.
Better to keep U.S. sanctions in place, strengthen them, enforce
secondary sanctions on other nations, and pursue the hard-trodden path
of diplomacy once more, difficult as it may be.
For all of these reasons, I believe the vote to disapprove is the right one.
اعلام الربيع العراقي
