When the US State Dept wants to get the press on board for talking
points but doesn't want to have any of its own holding the bag if it all
explodes, they do a background briefing. One took place last week.
Special Briefing
Office of the Spokesperson
Senior State Department Official
Washington, DC
May 20, 2015
MODERATOR: Hello. Good morning, everybody. So just to keep
introductions short, this discussion will be on background, so senior –
senior State Department official – sorry. Of course, you all know
[Senior State Department Official], but from here on out, it’s senior
State Department official. And we’ll let [Senior State Department
Official] say a few words to start, and we’ve got about 30 minutes so
we’ll try to get to questions right away. With that, [Senior State
Department Official], I’ll hand it over to you.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I thought I’d just go
through an opening briefing. I want to talk about Ramadi, what happened
in Ramadi. I want to talk about the Iraqi security response, the
political response, and what we’re seeing from the coalition and the
response.
First on Ramadi, I think it’s important to remember that ISIL first
moved in to Ramadi in force on January 1st, 2014, so that was six months
before Mosul. The city has been contested for 18 months. Half the city
had been under control of ISIL for some time. You might remember
Fallujah fell immediately in January of 2014. The Iraqis have been
fighting in Ramadi constantly for 18 months, and it was a very vicious,
bloody fight. They suffered thousands of casualties over these 18
months.
Our assessment of ISIL all the way back last summer – well, and we’ve
said this publicly – is that ISIL as an organization is better in every
respect than its predecessor of AQI; it’s better manned, it’s better
resourced, they have better fighters, they’re more experienced. And we
know what it took for us, the best military in the world, to get a
handle on AQI, so I think that also puts things in a little bit of
context.
We’ve been working with the Iraqis to hold the center of Ramadi for
some time, and I think the last time I spoke with you one of you asked
me what keeps you up at night or something. I said look, this is a
really formidable enemy; it’s going to have surprises and that’s going
to happen over the course of this, what will be a very long, multiyear
campaign.
Over the course of 96 hours in Ramadi, and what we’ve been able to
collect looking at different things, about 30 suicide VBIDs in Ramadi
and the environs of Ramadi. Ten of them, I’ve been told, had the
explosive capacity of an Oklahoma City type attack. So just to put that
in perspective.
QUESTION: Each of those 10?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Each of those 10. I can’t
confirm that, but that’s what I’ve been told. And if you look at the
pictures that ISIL has put out of the explosions – I mean, I have some
of them – it’s just they took out entire city blocks. And the death toll
of the Iraqi Security Forces is not entirely clear, but they lost some
leaders, and it was just a really psychological impact of the security
remnants that were remaining in Ramadi.
What happened on Sunday is the Iraqis sent – tried to send a
reinforcing column into the center of the city, which immediately came
under fire; retreated, which then began a broader retreat from where the
security forces were holding. And we’re still trying to piece together
exactly what happened there.
I think it’s important to note first extremely serious situation.
Nobody here from the President on down is saying that this is something
that we’ll just overcome immediately. It’s an extremely serious
situation, and I’ll talk about the Iraqis’ response as well because
they’re seeing it the same way. But it is not the Mosul collapse and
disintegration of units. In fact, the units that retreated, retreated,
consolidated, and they’re now moved – I won’t say where they are, but
they moved to three different points to consolidate, to refit, to
regroup, to re-equip. And those units are – the units that retreated
remain pretty much intact.
We’ve been working over the last about 96 hours constantly around the
clock with our team in Baghdad and our team here to work with the
Iraqis to hold – because we all remember the experience from Mosul,
where you just had a domino collapse – to hold their lines, consolidate,
and just basically hold together, begin to consolidate and think about
how to counter-attack. I think the silver lining here is – again, it
remains a very serious situation – is that the lines more or less have
held. And I’m not going to say exactly where, but you don’t have, again,
a Mosul situation of a collapse.
And we’re working with them now to think through consolidation,
forces, what to do. And it’s extremely complicated. We were just talking
to our team in the field. But there is a consolidation happening, so
it’s not a kind of – again, just far different situation than what we
saw in Mosul.
Iraqi political response has been encouraging. Prime Minister Abadi,
who is an engineer by training, he immediately wants to get to the root
of what exactly happened, what went wrong, what do they need to defend
against these suicide VBIDs, what do they need to correct some of the
deficiencies in the security forces, and whatever happened on –
particularly on Sunday. And he’s been looking at it in terms of really
fixing it at the root of what exactly happened.
At the same time, he immediately acted to pull together his entire
national security cabinet, and the whole cabinet – Sunni, Shia, Kurds –
they all met yesterday to develop a national program that they can all
rally behind and get behind. The focus now clearly being on Anbar
province, and they released a seven-point program yesterday which we
very much support. It’s focused on mobilizing tribal fighters in Anbar,
with a streamlined delivery mechanism for weapons – that’s something
we’ve been working on for some time, but that’s something that is
starting to move. And we’re going to use this – this particular
challenge to really accelerate it.
Recruiting into the Iraqi Army and specifically in their program they
released yesterday, they talk about the 7th Iraqi Army Division. That’s
the really depleted Anbar-based division that we’re working with all
the way out at Al Asad Air Base in western Anbar province. They talked
about recalling the Iraqi police from Anbar. There’s about 24,000 police
in Anbar who left their posts some time ago; they’ve issued amnesty for
those police and asked to recall them. And anyway, we think this is a
pretty good – a good program in terms of thinking about how to claw back
what was lost in Anbar.
The Iraqi parliament today completed a second reading of the national
guard law, which is also very important. And why this is important is
because the model of the new government of how to stabilize Iraq is a
much more decentralized model, much more autonomy in the provinces. And
Abadi actually in the wake of this crisis called together all the
governors and talked about decentralization, the importance of the
governors taking responsibility in their areas as powers are devolved to
their areas, and the national guard is a provincial-based security
force.
The tribal mobilization, which is kind of the bridge to the national
guard, is designed to collect the – what will be the foundation of a
national guard. So the Iraqis have already allocated resources, and
there’s a list of weapons that are approved for about 8,000 of the
tribal fighters in Anbar, which will be ultimately the national guard.
But that will take some time to get in place. But they’re moving forward
with that.
In terms of the coalition, we’ve been in touch with our coalition
partners, the core contributors to the coalition, and there’s been a
really positive response in terms of stepping up to help, and we’re now
working to figure out exactly who can help in what areas, and we’ll
defer to coalition capitals for that, but there will be more – much more
to follow on that.
In the Iraqi plan that they put – they released yesterday, there’s
also – they mentioned the stabilization funding mechanism, and they’ve
approved the stabilization fund with the United Nations, which is pretty
important, because what we found as we’ve been going forward here is
that the Iraqis – the government remains pretty cash poor. It can’t
access capital markets. It can’t do things to flood resources into areas
that are cleared, and that’s remained a real problem. So this new
funding mechanism that they’ve established with the UN is designed
specifically to get at that problem, for kind of quick-hit projects as
soon as areas are cleared, which is necessary. And also the humanitarian
response, which is just massive, and making sure that the UN programs –
because the UN teams in Iraq are doing an incredible, heroic job – are
funded, and that’s something that the coalition will be helping out with
as well.
So I would just say the top lines – I think a very serious situation.
Nobody is kidding themselves about what ISIL was able to pull off last
week. We’ve been working to consolidate the units that retreated from
Ramadi, and we think over the last 96 hours there has been a
consolidation which is positive. We’re going to work with the Iraqis to
organize, as best as possible, and begin to think about how to
counterattack, but this will take some time. This has to be done in a
coordinated way. And we had a meeting last night with President Obama to
talk about all potential – just different possible responses and how we
can help the Iraqis through this.
The politics again responded, we think, fairly well. Prime Minister
Abadi is – has had a number of crises now in his first eight or nine
months in office – this is another one – and we think he’s responded
quite well. And we fully support the program that they put together
which has the support of the Sunnis, most specifically in Anbar, but the
Sunnis and the Kurds in the government, which is very important. And
we’re encouraged by the second reading of the national guard law today,
although that’s a longer term project.
But the immediate focus – everybody’s focused on this – consolidating
the lines, holding the lines, organizing, and thinking about how to
begin a counterattack, and that’s what we’ve been focused on over the
last 96 hours.
MODERATOR: Okay. Thanks for those introductory comments. We’ll
try to get to as many questions as we can. We’ll start with Arshad in
the back and go around.
QUESTION: Is the U.S. Government completely at ease with the
deployment of Shia militias with Iranian links will perhaps command to
fight ISIL in Sunni areas, given the risks of further sectarianism? And
second, to ask kind of a heretical first principles question, why is it
vital to U.S. national interests to prevent Sunni majority and more
Sunni-majority areas of Iraq from falling under ISIL control?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: On the popular mobilization
forces, there was unanimous request from the Anbar provincial council –
unanimous – and those guys aren’t always unanimous – to request the
entry of Popular Mobilization Forces into Anbar. And the prime minister
responded to that and agreed to deploy some into Anbar. How those forces
are used, what forces are used, and what makeup and what composition
are really the key questions. In the cabinet release last night, which
again was unanimous from the Iraqi side, they said all forces, tribes,
Popular Mobilization Forces, Iraqi Security Forces, have to be operating
under the Iraqi chain of command. That’s the same thing that we
support. We think that’s the only way to do this in a coordinated way.
They are as sensitive as anyone to the use of certain units in populated
areas. So we leave it to the Iraqis to work this out, but we also have
worked with them very closely with the lessons learned from Tikrit about
the importance of having units under an Iraqi command and control
structure, because that’s the way to actually conduct operations that
are effective.
In terms of U.S. national security interests, ISIL is a significant
threat to all of our partners in the region, a significant threat to the
homeland. The suicide bombers in Ramadi, most of them – because this is
the pattern – are foreign fighters. Foreign fighters come from all
around the world, a hundred countries, around the nation, come into
Syria and into Iraq to commit mass murder as suicide bombers, and ISIL
can very easily redirect those committed jihadis and suicide bombers
into other capitals, and that’s why we have to defeat this organization.
However, it’s going to take a long time, and we’ve been very, very
clear about that.
And we talk about in terms of years. And years because of our
assessment of the strength of ISIL and what it represents, and I’ll just
say – I’ve said this before – we’ve never seen something like this.
We’ve never seen a terrorist organization with 22,000 foreign fighters
from a hundred countries all around the world. To put it in context –
again, the numbers are fuzzy – but it’s about double of what went into
Afghanistan over 10 years in the war against the Soviet Union. Those
jihadi fighters were from a handful of countries. These guys are coming
from a hundred different countries. You combine that with social media,
their efforts to inspire homegrown attacks, not even to have fighters
come and train but do attacks at home, this is a formidable, enormous
threat.
And it thrives on the notion of an expanding caliphate. To ISIL, we
look at all their – what they say to themselves. They see their entire
campaign as a war of flags, expanding the flags, and so that’s why this
is very important. And we’ve done a pretty good job at constricting them
and defeating them in some significant areas and terrain, but I would
never say this is not a very significant setback. It was, and ISIL is
using it for full propaganda value, although in Ramadi we have air
coverage overhead 24/7. They’re not parading around the streets of
Ramadi, and when we see them, we’re going to kill them in Ramadi.
MODERATOR: Okay. Carol, and then we’ll --
QUESTION: Has there been any discussion about sending Special Forces in, as happened in Syria last week? Might we see more of that?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The President’s always said
and Chairman Dempsey has also said that the chairman will make a
recommendation when he thinks the military needs might demand our
advisors forward. But that recommendation has not been made, so I really
defer to DOD and the chain of command on that.
MODERATOR: Okay. Jo.
QUESTION: Thanks very much, [Senior State Department
Official]. You mentioned about streamlining the delivery of weapons to
local tribes. Could you talk a little bit more about that? The White
House yesterday was telling – (inaudible) was telling us that there was –
you were bandying around ideas on how to accelerate training and
equipping local tribes, given that also some of the local tribes have
complained that the weapons that you’re supplying haven’t been getting
from Baghdad out to them.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah. So this – obviously,
this didn’t just happen after Ramadi. We were working this for some
time, and the system that’s in place and was put in place a few weeks
ago is – there’s an approved list of small and medium weapons. It’s been
approved by the government; it’s been approved by the governor of Anbar
Province. The governor has even been delegated authority to procure
weapons on his own, and we have a delivery mechanism that’s been
approved by all the right parties in the government, in the MOD to get
the weapons into the right hands. And we think that’s a pretty good,
streamlined process.
So for example, if a coalition partner wants to donate weapons to
tribal fighters, we can give a pretty good guarantee of how that
distribution’s going to go. And we didn’t really have that before,
because, first, we were focused on other issues because it’s a very
complicated battlefield and landscape. But we have that in place now and
we think that’s pretty good. We’re, of course – our presence is at
al-Asad, which is in western Anbar. So the tribes out there have a bit
of an advantage because we’re based there, and we’ll be using Asad for
that purpose – again, working through the Iraqi minister of defense.
I read this too, and – look, I more than anybody want these guys,
particularly the guys in Anbar and the Sunnis, to beat ISIS, which is
killing their families and burning down their houses and committing all
sorts of horrific atrocities. We’re learning more of them in the wake of
the Abu Sayyaf raid, of just how barbaric this organization is. And we
have flooded weapons to particularly Ramadi over the last 18 months. You
can – there’s a lot of sheikhs. I meet them. I meet them in Amman, in
Erbil, in Dubai, all over the place; meet them in Iraq. And we’ve said
repeatedly, if you have people on the ground ready to fight Daesh, ready
to fight ISIS, tell us where they are. Let’s work together, and we will
help you defeat them. I think we have a record now over the last six to
eight months of working with groups on the ground. They’re ready to
fight Daesh; we will help them. We do it in Iraq in a coordinated way
because it has to be coordinated. But anyone on the ground that is ready
to fight Daesh, we are prepared to help them together with the Iraqi
Government.
MODERATOR: Okay. Saul then Brad.
QUESTION: The Iranian defense minister apparently flew into
Baghdad on Monday. Does it look like the Iranians are stepping up their
military guidance because of what happened in Ramadi? Do you have
concern about that?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I think – first, that was a –
as I understand it, that was a preplanned visit. But – and we know the –
Iraq and Iran has had a relationship for some time, and that’s simply
something that is realistic and quite natural.
Iran always wants to makes itself seem like the indispensable player
in Iraq. So you always see them in a moment of crisis come in and say,
“We’re here to help and we can help immediately.” They do that all the
time, and they’re probably going to help here in various ways. I think
what’s important is that they fully respect Iraq’s sovereignty and
sovereign wishes, and as Prime Minister Abadi said when he was here,
what is a hostile act to Iraq is operating forces on Iraqi soil outside
the command and control system of the Iraqi Government. And so, again, I
defer to Iraq in terms of how it wants to manage its relationship with
the Iranians, but the principle is respect for Iraqi sovereignty and
Iraqi wishes.
QUESTION: But do you expect to be seeing now an increase in the number of advisors from Iran? Isn’t – wouldn’t that be natural for --
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We haven’t seen that yet.
MODERATOR: Okay. Brad and then Justin. We’ll come around --
QUESTION: You said that this can’t be immediately overcome.
How many months or even years, dare I say, has this – has Ramadi set
back the effort? And just wanted to ask – you kind of vaguely said that –
consider more things without changing the strategy. Would you – are you
guys willing at this point to do things like JTACs on the ground to
call in strikes or more advisors into the field to work directly with
units, as opposed to brigade level at headquarters?
SENIOR STATE DEPARMENT OFFICIAL: In terms of timing, we’re
eight months into a – what was always a three-year campaign, and it’s
three years to degrade. So again, we’ve been very realistic about how
difficult this is going to be. So I just – I don’t want to put
timeframes on it. I think some of the timeframes that might’ve been
announced by various folks over the course of this thing might’ve been a
little bit unrealistic. It’s three years – three-year campaign, three
years to degrade.
In terms of taking back Ramadi, we’re going to help the Iraqis do it
as soon as possible, and we have aircraft overhead to try to take out
anytime the Daesh is going to try to set up defensive berms or defensive
perimeters. But again, it’s difficult, and it’s difficult without
people on the ground and eyes on the ground. And I – in terms of that
issue, we have Iraqis we work with as observers. But again, in terms of
putting U.S. JTACs into the field, that’s a decision entirely for the
chain of command that would go through the Secretary of Defense to the
President, and right now that’s not something that has been recommended.
MODERATOR: Okay, Justin.
QUESTION: Just a couple of technical questions about the fight
in Ramadi. You – do you have an estimate about how many fighters – ISIS
fighters were in Ramadi? How many ISF fighters fled? And when they
fled, did they lay down these weapons that you said were flooded into
Ramadi, did they leave them behind? There’ve been some images of that.
And then my second question would be: Is there a clear military strategy
to retake Ramadi?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So really good questions. I
would be very hesitant to say a number of Daesh fighters in Ramadi and
also I’d be hesitant if anyone is telling you a number, because it’s
very hard to tell these things. When Mosul fell, I think our estimate
was that Daesh as an organization had only about 5- to 10,000. We then
adjusted that and said, no, it’s actually 30,000. These are very hard to
tell. So we don’t know.
What we do know is that about half of Ramadi has been under Daesh
control for about a year, and in their offensive they launched a month
ago they took another quarter of it. So they have been controlling
significant portions of the city for some time. What happened last
weekend was they had this massive suicide wave that at the governing
center, which was kind of the center of it, the kind of secured zone.
And again, you can see the pictures they put out. It was incredibly
devastating, just horrific, gigantic explosions that took out entire
city blocks. So they have a force in Ramadi. I don’t know the numbers.
And I don’t think – I also don’t think it’s one that can’t be overcome.
I don’t have the numbers of Iraqis that retreated. They did leave
some equipment behind. I’m told that when we see Daesh trying to get
ahold of that equipment, we’ll take care of that problem. But they also –
again, unlike Mosul, in which you had security forces just drop their
uniforms and flee these units – I wouldn’t call it organized, but they
retreated in a way that they took most of their stuff, and then they
stopped at a defensive point and consolidated. And they’re now in the
process of – I was just told talking to our guys out there they’re now
in the process of refueling, refitting, licking their wounds a bit, and
consolidating. So in the wake of Mosul, having lived through that, at
this point in Mosul there was just a real disintegration happening , and
that’s not at all what we’re seeing here; quite the opposite. However
--
MODERATOR: Okay – sorry. Felicia, then Tolga.
QUESTION: So with the renewed focus on Anbar, how does that
impact the Mosul timing at all? And does the focus on Anbar mean pushing
the Islamic State out of Fallujah as well?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Fallujah is a little
isolated pocket, which we always – again, up to the Iraqis, but you can
kind of isolate it and do some other things. And I defer to my military
colleagues, but you’ve got to do Anbar – you can call it shaping for
Mosul, you can call it – but you got to do Anbar to isolate Mosul. So –
and that means Baghdad to Ramadi, Ramadi to Haditha. And Haditha is out
at Al Asad where we’re based. And I just – look, I think this is going
to take some time, so it’s going to be very difficult. Anyone who knows
Anbar province from back when we were there, it’s going to be really
hard.
But what we were hearing from the Iraqis up and down the board – and I
was on the phone with some of the Anbaris today – they are – nobody is
panicking. They are – what they are telling us is we’re ready to rise to
this challenge. And everybody is focused like a laser on Anbar right
now, so there’s some other fights going on which are really important.
There’s Baiji, there’s some stuff going on out in Haditha, but – which,
of course, is in Anbar. But really everybody’s focused on Anbar.
MODERATOR: Okay. Tolga.
QUESTION: And just to follow on to – oh, sorry. Can I ask one more?
MODERATOR: Go ahead.
QUESTION: Just to follow on to Brad’s question with the
timing, does this pushback that – and you said some of the timing was
perhaps unrealistic --
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Again, I would never put
timeframes on anything, so Mosul will happen when it’s ready. So it
could be some time from now, but we’re focused on Anbar.
MODERATOR: Tolga, then Pam.
QUESTION: How about the population left in Ramadi after the
invasion of Ramadi? How many people are there right now? Because the
CENTCOM released the new attacks records for 24 – the last 24 hours that
there were nothing in Ramadi. Sixteen strikes in – from Mosul to
Fallujah but not in Ramadi. What are the challenge – challenges to
retake Ramadi in terms of the population left in there, and could you
please make a comparison between Kobani and Ramadi? You made a
comparison between Mosul and Ramadi, and you said that there – at least
there was a tactical retreat, that there is no (inaudible)
disintegration in terms of the Iraq Security Forces, but what went wrong
in Ramadi while you succeeded in Kobani? What was the main difference?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I’m not going to put numbers
on who’s left in Ramadi, but right now the streets look pretty barren
from what we’re seeing. We have done airstrikes today in Ramadi, I’ve
been told. So when we see targets, we’re going to take them out, and we
have the area pretty well covered.
There’s been, of course, a large refugee flow, which our humanitarian
people are dealing with with the United Nations and we’re dealing with
the Iraqi Government about how to manage that in an organized way. And
it’s also one reason why we hope our coalition partners will consider
helping with the UN response in terms of financial contributions.
Look, Kobani – just a different situation. But Kobani was about to
fall as well. There was a little – if you looked on a map, it was just a
pencil – I lived through that – in terms of organizing to push back and
working with the Turks and the Kurdish Peshmerga to do that in an
organized way, which was quite successful. Had Daesh been able to do in
Kobani what they did over the weekend in Ramadi with 10 of these massive
VBIEDs, Kobani would have fallen too, but they weren’t able to do that.
So the attacks over the weekend in Ramadi were just quite devastating
in terms of ISIL attacks. And you can go see them, and I have some
pictures in my – there was a armored bulldozer which knocked over the
T-wall perimeters, which then was the first explosion. They then had an
armored dump truck, an armored Humvee, and you can see what they do.
They weld these things so they’re totally impervious to a lot of weapons
systems that the Iraqis have to try to take them out. It was one of – I
have to say it was one of Abadi’s main demands when he was here. He
needed a weapon system to defeat suicide VBIEDs. And we made the
decision immediately while he was here to get 1,000 AT4 anti-tank
systems to Iraqi Security Forces. And those are going to be arriving
fairly soon. And that’s specifically, as I understand it – I’ll defer to
experts on this, but that’s specifically a kind of close-in weapon
system for a VBIED that is coming in your direction. The Peshmerga have
been using them to good effect and we’re getting 1,000 to the Iraqi
Security Forces.
QUESTION: Days, weeks? What’s the timeframe?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Weeks. Early June, I’m told.
MODERATOR: Okay. Pam.
QUESTION: A couple of questions. The first one goes back to
Iran. Overall, how much influence do you think Iran has over the Iraqi
Government in terms of the anti-ISIS coalition at this point? And how is
that affecting U.S. operations against the Islamic State?
And then my second question is you referenced the meeting yesterday
with the President looking at possible responses. In addition to
airstrikes, is there anything else that bubbles to the top that you can
talk about in terms of action that the coalition is considering?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: On the second question, I’m
just not going to get ahead of the process and what might be considered
or not considered. I’m sorry, I just can’t really get into that. The
meeting was a very firm affirmation for the leadership of Prime Minister
Abadi, who is managing multiple crises, and for – we think the plan
they laid out is a pretty good one, and we’re going to help them with
that as much as we can. And then anything else that we’re thinking
about, I just can’t – I really can’t get into.
MODERATOR: Okay. Very little time left in – I’m sorry, Iran and then --
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The issue of Iran – again,
Iran and Iraq have a relationship. It’s something that has been with us
for some time. It’s something that’s natural and is going to continue.
And it becomes problematic if Iran is doing things on Iraqi soil that
are contrary to the sovereignty and the wishes of the Iraqi Government.
So again, we just have to see.
MODERATOR: Okay. Very short. Barbara?
QUESTION: Just quickly, you’re talking about consolidating the
ISF units. How is that working practically with the Popular
Mobilization Forces? We’ve been hearing they’ve arrived but they haven’t
– that they’re sort of waiting to take positions. Or is how that being
coordinated?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah. So some of them are –
and unclear in numbers or what – but are gathering at Habbaniyah, which
is an airbase. And that’s a consolidation point. But you’ve got to
remember, the Popular Mobilization Forces, of about 80,000 of them, the
majority of them are guys that volunteered in the wake of Sistani’s
fatwa last year. They’re volunteer fighters. They can work very closely
with Sunnis; these are all Iraqis. There are other units within the
Popular Mobilization Forces on the Shia side that are different, that
are militias that are organized not by Iraqis, frankly. So those are
different types of units. And so you have to look at this fairly
diagnostically, and what units go where will be important, and I think
the Iraqis understand the sensitivities as well as anybody. And they’re
working this out as we speak.
QUESTION: So there are no Shia militias in the so-called Popular Mobilization Forces?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, there are Shia militias within the 80,000 – the usual suspects of KH and AH that we know quite well.
QUESTION: The so the point that you’re making is that some are
Shia militias that you wouldn’t want to go to certain areas, and others
are Shia fighters who you’d be okay with going --
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: It’s just a facility there are more provocative – some units are quite provocative in Sunni areas. And so --
QUESTION: And --
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: And we want to be very
careful before we do airstrikes, because we’re coming from the air, we
don’t have people on the ground. We don’t want to have a situation in
which we mistakenly strike a Shia militia, because that would cause all
sorts of problems. So this has – that’s why we – the importance of Iraqi
command and control. Because the way we do operations with the Iraqis,
and every time we’ve done one, they’ve been quite successful, all the
way from Mosul Dam to – I can go all the way down to Kisik Junction, to
Haditha. We take some time to really do the intelligence, to soak the
area, to figure out what’s going on, to organize the forces through our
joint operations center that we have, which has been up now for a year –
is working pretty effectively – to organize the forces, who goes where,
so then our airstrikes can work in a very deliberate, coordinated
manner.
If there are units on the field that aren’t responsive to that chain
of command, we can’t tell from the air who’s who and it can be very
chaotic. So that’s why particularly in Tikrit we said, “You got to get a
handle on who’s who and who’s where and get control over the units on
the field.” Because we’re very careful with our air – it’s been one of
the most precise air campaigns in history thus far, and we’re very
careful with it. So we want to make sure that Iraqi forces on the ground
are as much as possible under Iraqi command.
QUESTION: Even in Tikrit, though, there were fairly well
documented reports of Shia militias afterwards rampaging, burning
people, clearly not operating under any kind of Iraqi central government
command and control. And so the fundamental question that I have is:
What gives you – I mean, Tikrit was not that longer ago. What gives you
the confidence that these militias, which have the autonomy of their own
armaments, are actually going to be taking orders from Baghdad, and are
not in fact going to be operating on their own?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Again, this is something
we’ve got to work through. So before we do an operation and make sure
that it’s a coordinated operation, we have to have as much as possible
fidelity over who is on the field. But it is very difficult.
QUESTION: How do you do that without coordinating or working somehow with the Iranians?
MODERATOR: Michel.
QUESTION: Do you think that the coalition strategy is working,
especially after the advances made by ISIS in Ramadi and advances made
in Syria yesterday and today in Tadmor? And are you planning to do
anything in Tadmor to help the regime, for example, to stop ISIS?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Right now the immediate
focus – at least for me, who’s briefing you – has been Anbar. So that’s
what I’ve been focused on for the last 96 hours. And in terms of the
overall campaign, as I said in the beginning, you would have to be
delusional not to take something like this and say, “What went wrong,
how do you fix it, and how do we correct course to go from here?” And
that’s exactly what we’re doing, taking an extremely hard look at it.
One of the main things is the tactic of these enormous suicide VBIEDs is
something that we have to help the Iraqis and our partners in Syria
defeat. So that’s something we’re looking at very closely. And in terms
of the particular response in Anbar and Ramadi, again, we’re looking at a
number of things, but I don’t want to get ahead of the process.
MODERATOR: We got time for just two more. Hannah, go ahead.
QUESTION: Okay. First of all, on the refugee issue, what are
you – what are the discussions with Abadi about letting people in? I
mean, you’ve got thousands of people stranded, four days, they can’t go
back, they get killed, they won’t let them in even with a sponsor now.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So I understand – again,
I’ve been told as of this morning that the bridge has been open for
refugees with a sponsor with a place to – what that means is that they
need a place to go in Baghdad because you can’t just have a – otherwise,
you just have a really chaotic situation which can quickly get out of
control. So the bridge has been open to refugees with a sponsor in
Baghdad. And the UN, again, who is doing just heroic work, is working to
set up facilities for those who are on the other side of the bridge.
That’s what’s happening as we speak, so hopefully, I’ll have a little
more for you in the next 24 hours or so.
QUESTION: And then just lastly on Habbaniyah, is there no –
what is the U.S. presence at Habbaniyah? Are there security contractors
involved in the training? If so, how many?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah. I’ve seen different
reports, a lot of it being ISIS propaganda. I’ve seen that we have taken
out our advisors from Habbaniyah and we never had advisors at
Habbaniyah.
QUESTION: Whether military or (inaudible)?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Right. I’ve seen that we’ve
taken out our advisors at al-Asad. That’s absolutely not true. We’re at
al-Asad working with the tribes in the 7th IA as we speak. So – but we
have not been on the ground at Habbaniyah.
In terms of what we might do in Anbar additionally, again, that’s
something that is – I won’t get ahead of any decision processes with the
president.
MODERATOR: Okay. Last question there.
QUESTION: Yeah. How many Sunni tribal fighters have actually
been trained and equipped in Anbar so far? And how can you better
coordinate airstrikes in support of their operations going forward? I
know you said they’ve got 24/7 in Ramadi now going forward.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, really good question.
So where it works well has been out at al-Asad. We’re working with three
tribes – the Jughayfis, the Albu Mahal, Albu Nimr, primarily, the
Jughayfis who are out there. And we are able to coordinate them – with
them, advise and assist. It’s not perfect. It’s really hard. I’ve been
out there twice. It’s like Wild West. I mean, really tough. But we’re
able to directly coordinate and provide them very close in support and
coordinate their operations. And we’ve had some success of the --
QUESTION: From the area?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes, although ISIS fights
back. But we have our special forces there on the ground at Asad. We
just don’t – we don’t accompany. We don’t go out with them. So that’s
where it works the best. We don’t have that in eastern Anbar, frankly,
so it’s just a different – it’s a little more difficult.
What the Iraqis have done is they’ve used Habbaniyah, they’ve set up
Habbaniyah to be the same type of facility that we have at al-Asad,
where – collect tribal fighters, organize them so they’re on a payroll,
give them a weapon. And that started about three weeks ago, and there
was going to be a ceremony on Monday on this same thing with about
another thousand fighters. But that’s going to continue.
So the Iraqis are using Habbaniyah with the same model that we’ve
used at Asad quite effectively, and we want to build on that. And so in
terms of this consolidation, making sure that those areas remain
controlled is very important. We think they will remain controlled. And
it’s a huge facility. I mean, it’s a huge airbase, Habbaniyah and also
Taqaddum across the street. It’s enormous. So, I mean, that’s how
they’re collecting them.
In terms of numbers, there’s budget and weapons for 8,000 tribal
fighters in Anbar province, and there’s also the 24,000 police and
there’s the now recruiting into the 7th IA, that I don’t have a figure
on yet. So those are the numbers. And we collect them at al-Asad, which
has been effective, and the Iraqis are now setting up this hub at
Habbaniyah, which started – there was a ceremony 10 days ago or so,
which you may have seen in the media, because it was – I know there was
some media there.
QUESTION: But of 8,000 and 24,000, how many have actually now returned or are trained?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The 24,000 are – of the total, if you ask the guys who do the police, there were a total of 24,000 Anbari policemen before --
QUESTION: Right.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: -- this crisis started 18 months ago.
QUESTION: They fled (inaudible).
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: And they fled.
QUESTION: And how many came back?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: And obviously didn’t come back. This is just – the police part has just started and --
QUESTION: Okay.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: -- the police part is long term.
QUESTION: And of the 8,000 that you budgeted to train and
equip, how many of those are actually now in the field or in the
pipeline, at least?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I actually do have a figure that I – but I just don’t want to get into a direct figure. But it’s in the thousands.
QUESTION: Low thousands, mid thousands?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Mid thousands.
QUESTION: Okay.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So if you look on a map of
the Euphrates and the dashes – so it’s Raqqah to Ramadi to Fallujah –
there’s a red swatch sweep and then there’s a green circle at Haditha,
Baghdadi, which is where we’re present, which is where we’re working
with those tribes, and which has been pretty effective. So we have an
operational platform there, and they’ve been able to hold and expand
their territory.
The Iraqis want to do the same thing at Habbaniyah, where you collect
the tribes with the eastern tribes and do the same thing to create this
other circle. And that, of course, is not far from Ramadi. So I don’t
want to get into the consolidation points that we’re going to use, but
Habbaniyah will certainly be one of them.
QUESTION: And it’s 8,000 that the Iraqis have budgeted, it’s not (inaudible)?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, 8,000 tribal fighters
in Anbar, and the weapons have been all approved and it’s just – we have
to get them to the site and get them to the guys.
QUESTION: As far as actually fighting on the ground and the –
to – in – as part of these in the line-holding and consolidation and
everything, how many Sunni tribal fighters are involved now?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: In Anbar?
QUESTION: Yeah.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Overall Sunni fighters,
according to our count, is above 10,000. It’s now above 10,000. And
about 22,000 are on the rolls, but 10,000 are actually in the program.
In Anbar, I just don’t have the figure off the top of my head, but I’ve –
I’ll get it to you.
QUESTION: So it’s national, that’s – nation – that’s in the program overall, not necessarily fighting?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, Nineveh – right, so
Nineveh – Nineveh there’s no presence, but we’re training about 6,000 in
the Mosul fighting force and a number of other guys from Atheel
Nujaifi’s these guys. And also in Salah ad Din and in – and then in
Anbar, mostly at al-Asad but now at Habbaniyah.
MODERATOR: Okay. Thanks very much, [Senior State Department
Official]. Again, this is on background, Senior State Department
Official. Thanks for coming and thanks (inaudible).